This article develops the ideas of infinite questioning and emergent dialogue as key characteristics of philosophical consultations. The authors have been members of a philosophical circle for several years, in which these and other aspects of the philosophical consultations have been shared, considered, and reflected upon, leading to the contouring of an integrated, embodied and dynamic approach, which is going to be described with reference to supporting theory and practice. Authors’ professional expertise ranges from philosophy with children, with parents, with (...) teachers, with students, with individual clients and small groups or organisations. Philosophical counsellors are described as experts in not-knowing and we attempt to provide an integrative and clear view of their professional role, seeing that philosophers live a human life like their clients and therefore have no ultimate answers in response to clients’ questions. They do however have a paradoxical expertise, which we call expertise in not-knowing. This involves the art of questioning, particular skills for navigating the unpredictable territories of emergent dialogue and an availability to accompany deep reflective processes in a professional context in which the lines between expert and non-expert can be blurred. Both the professional and the client are self-reflecting, self-aware and exposed to shifts or transformation in their being and in their relating to the world, following a philosophical consultation. In this space of joint not-knowing, the expert can provide a sense of balance and stability based on trust and empathy in the relationship with the client. After developing these themes with references, examples and experiences from the practical work of each circle member in various contexts will be presented as illustrations. A conceptualization of results is drawn from common feedback and formal assessment following professional work with different types of clients as well as from the experienced impact by the facilitators of working in this way, as shared and processed in these circle meetings, where their work is periodically debriefed and reflected upon. (shrink)

Bohr’s work in quantum mechanics posed a challenge to philosophers of science, who struggled with the question of whether and to what degree his theories and methods could be considered rational. This paper focuses on Popper, Feyerabend, Lakatos and Kuhn, all of whom recognized some irrational, dogmatic, paradoxical or even inconsistent features in Bohr’s work. Popper, Feyerabend, and Lakatos expressed strong criticism of Bohr’s approach to quantum physics, while Kuhn argued that such criticism was unlikely to be fruitful: progress in (...) science is generally not made through philosophical reflection. Feyerabend’s criticism of Bohr gradually weakened, as he gained a more detailed understanding of the development of Bohr’s views on quantum mechanics, and this went together with an increasingly critical view of normative philosophy of science and was instrumental to his conversion to ‘anarchism’. This paper aims to show that quantum mechanics played a central role in their debates and disagreements on the rationality of science and the possibility of a normative philosophy of science. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Over the past few decades the concept of (human) dignity has deeply pervaded medical ethics. Appeals to dignity, however, are often unclear. As a result some prefer to eliminate the concept from medical ethics, whereas others try to render it useful in this context. We think that appeals to dignity in medical ethics can be clarified by considering the concept from an historical perspective. Firstly, on the basis of historical texts we propose a framework for defining the concept in (...) medical debates. The framework shows that dignity can occur in a relational, an unconditional, a subjective and a Kantian form. Interestingly, all forms relate to one concept since they have four features in common: dignity refers, in a restricted sense, to the ‘special status of human beings’; it is based on essential human characteristics; the subject of dignity should live up to it; and it is a vulnerable concept, it can be lost or violated. We argue that being explicit about the meaning of dignity will prevent dignity from becoming a conversation‐stopper in moral debate. Secondly, an historical perspective on dignity shows that it is not yet time to dispose of dignity in medical ethics. At least Kantian and relational dignity can be made useful in medical ethics. (shrink)

The purpose of this note is to observe a generalization of the concept "computable in..." to arbitrary partial combinatory algebras. For every partial combinatory algebra (pca) A and every partial endofunction on A, a pca A[f] is constructed such that in A[f], the function f is representable by an element; a universal property of the construction is formulated in terms of Longley's 2-category of pcas and decidable applicative morphisms. It is proved that there is always a geometric inclusion from the (...) realizability topos on A[f] into the one on A and that there is a meaningful preorder on the partial endofunctions on A which generalizes Turing reducibility. (shrink)

Matthijs van Boxsel believes that no one is intelligent enough to understand their own stupidity. In The Encyclopædia of Stupidity he shows how stupidity manifests itself in all areas, in everyone, at all times, proposing that stupidity is the foundation of our civilization. In short sections with such titles as ‘The Blunderers’ Club’, ‘Fools in Hell’, ‘Genealogy of Idiots’, and ‘The Aesthetics of the Empty Gesture’, stupidity is analysed on the basis of fairy tales, cartoons, triumphal arches, garden architecture, Baroque (...) ceilings, jokes, flimsy excuses and science fiction. But Van Boxsel wants to do more than just assemble a ‘shadow cabinet’ of wisdom; he tries to fathom the logic of this opposite world. Where do understanding and intelligence begin and end? He examines mythic fools such as Cyclops and King Midas, cities such as Gotham, archetypes including the dumb blonde, and traditionally stupid animals such as the goose, the donkey and the headless chicken. Van Boxsel posits that stupidity is a condition for intelligence, that blunders stimulate progress, that failure is the basis for success. In this erudite and witty book he maintains that our culture is the product of a series of failed attempts to comprehend stupidity. (shrink)

Lara Buchak argues that her version of rank-weighted utilitarianism can accommodate an implication of the separateness of persons known as “the shift,” since it requires individuals to be more willing to accept risk for themselves than to accept inequality in society. I argue that this is mistaken. Buchak’s model fails to yield the shift when the decision-maker is distinct from the affected individual, as well as in certain social decisions where the risk attitude of the group is known. These findings (...) suggest that models which derive social choice rules from individual decision rules will generally fail to uphold separateness. (shrink)

Introduction to collection of papers by group of scholars and ACO missionaries brought together to discuss the developments within the ACO over the past hundred years during a conference that was organised by Dr Wilbert van Saane of Haigazian University in January 2021. I will briefly summarise what strikes me as characteristic of the ACO on the basis of these articles, and conclude with a discussion of how this may contribute to further reflection in Mission Studies and World Christianity.

### ­ In Who shall go first? A multicriteria approach to patient selection for first clinical trials of cardiac xenotransplantation, Kögel et al recommend the inclusion of patients who (1) have a (high) medical need for an allograft, (2) have the capacity to benefit from a xenograft, (3) have a ‘real’ choice between enrolment in a first-in-human clinical trial and an alternative life-sustaining treatment option and (4) have no clear record of previous non-compliance.1 As the authors discuss, patient selection must (...) promote the goal of gaining reliable and valid knowledge about the risks and benefits of cardiac xenotransplantation. While the four criteria outlined above certainly promote this goal, we argue it is crucial to add a fifth criterion emphasising the need to include diverse populations, particularly regarding sex, age, ethnicity and socioeconomic background.i In this commentary, we present two arguments for our claim and discuss the impact of neglecting diversity from the first trials on. ### The scientific rationale for including diverse populations First, including diverse populations in the first clinical trials of cardiac xenotransplantation enhances the scientific value of the data by assessing safety and efficacy among various populations. Treatment response can differ among patient (sub)groups as a result of genetic, physiological and socioeconomic factors.2 By including diverse populations from the first trials on, researchers can identify these …. (shrink)

The question of human control is a key concern in autonomous military systems debates. Our research qualitatively and quantitatively investigates values and concerns of the general public, as they relate to autonomous military systems, with particular attention to the value of human control. Using participatory value evaluation (PVE), we consulted 1980 Australians about which values matter in relation to two specific technologies: an autonomous minesweeping submarine and an autonomous drone that can drop bombs. Based on value sensitive design, participants were (...) tasked to enhance the systems with design features that can realize values. A restriction (limited budget) in each design task forced participants to make trade-offs between design options and the values that these options realize. Our results suggest that the ‘general public’ has diverse and nuanced stances on the question of human control over autonomous military systems. A third of participants that is opposed to autonomous military systems when asked directly, selected different combinations of design features realizing varying degrees of human control. Several contextual factors, technology-specific concerns, and certain values seemed to explain these different choices. Our research shows that a focus on human control might overlook other important values that the general public is concerned about, such as system reliability, verifiability, and retrievability. (shrink)

This book analyzes the sociopolitical sensibilities of Black aesthetics in society by examining the historical and political context in which Black aesthetics emerged; analyzing various Black aesthetic perspectives that speak to social justice; exploring the interpretive conditions necessary to perceive Black aesthetics as a language of social justice.

Ever since at least Aristotle, it has been widely recognized that a theory of responsibility must allow for the fact that in certain conditions agents are excused for not doing what they ought to do —and accordingly that they cannot be held responsible for what they did not, or did, do. In such conditions they are not appropriate candidates for one of what Strawson has called the "reactive attitudes" such as resentment, contempt, gratitude, and affection. Let us call such conditions (...) excusing conditions. The main aim of this paper is to show that the very same conditions that can excuse agents for not doing what they ought to do , also can excuse them for having false beliefs. As an afterthought it is suggested that this is a reason for thinking that humans can sometimes be held responsible for what they believe. (shrink)

Van Riper kept this class grade book for second semester, 1916- 1917, for philosophy and psychology classes he taught at Pennsylvania State College.

It is frequently said that pain is incommunicable and even that it destroys language . This paper offers a phenomenological account of pain and then explores and critiques this view. It suggests not only that pain is communicable to an adequate degree for clinical purposes, but also that it is itself a form of communication through which the person in pain appeals to the empathy and ethical goodness of the clinician. To explain this latter idea and its ethical implications, reference (...) is made to the writings of Emmanuel Levinas. (shrink)

Moral case deliberation (MCD) is a specific form of clinical ethics, aiming to stimulate ethical reflection in daily practice in order to improve the quality of care. This article focuses on the implementation of MCD in nursing homes and the questions how and where to organize MCD. The purpose of this study was to evaluate one way of organizing MCD in two Dutch nursing homes. In both of these nursing homes the MCD groups had a heterogeneous composition and were organized (...) apart from existing institutional communication structures. As part of a naturalistic evaluation, systematic observations, interviews and focus groups were completed. The findings indicate that the heterogeneous composition and MCD meetings separate from existing structures have benefits. However, the participants also reported negative experiences. This gives rise to the question whether a mixed MCD group which meets separately is an effective way to embed MCD as an instrument for reflection on moral issues in daily practice. We conclude that there is no single answer to that question. In the end, the two implementation strategies (i.e. within existing communication structures and a mixed MCD group) can be complementary to each other. (shrink)

Profiling technologies are the facilitating force behind the vision of Ambient Intelligence in which everyday devices are connected and embedded with all kinds of smart characteristics enabling them to take decisions in order to serve our preferences without us being aware of it. These technological practices have considerable impact on the process by which our personhood takes shape and pose threats like discrimination and normalisation. The legal response to these developments should move away from a focus on entitlements to personal (...) data, towards making transparent and controlling the profiling process by which knowledge is produced from these data. The tendency in intellectual property law to commodify information embedded in software and profiles could counteract this shift to transparency and control. These rights obstruct the access and contestation of the design of the code that impacts one’s personhood. This triggers a political discussion about the public nature of this code and forces us to rethink the relations between property, privacy and personhood in the digital age. (shrink)

Inwagen, Peter van_Dispensing with Ontological Levels.

Many global problems nowadays are collective action problems. It is only because many people act in some way that certain problems arise (e.g., climate harms). But when can one be said to participate in such groups in the first place? As Derek Parfit asked, “When we appeal to what groups together do, whom should we count as members of these groups?” As Julia Nefsky has shown, this problem has proven to be notoriously tricky, and without any adequate solution. We present (...) a solution. The proposed account not only overcomes a number of problems for participation-based views, according to which it is morally problematic to participate in such groups at all, but also helps make precise a prominent alternative view, according to which one should help bring about better outcomes. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in (...) the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Norman's reconciliation of the two theories of perception is challenged because it directly leads to the nature-nurture dichotomy in the development of the two visual systems. In contrast, the proposition of a separate development of the two visual systems may be better understood as involving different types of information that follow a distinct temporal sequence.

The view that persons are entitled to respect because of their moral agency is commonplace in contemporary moral theory. What exactly this respect entails, however, is far less uncontroversial. In this book, Van der Rijt argues powerfully that this respect for persons’ moral agency must also encompass respect for their subjective moral judgments – even when these judgments can be shown to be fundamentally flawed. Van der Rijt scrutinises the role persons’ subjective moral judgments play within the context of coercion (...) and domination. His fresh, original analysis of Kant’s third formulation of the Categorical Imperative reveals how these judgments are intimately connected to a person’s dignity. The result is an insightful new account of coercion, a novel Kantian reformulation of the republican notion of non-domination and a compelling, innovative argument in favour of retributive justice. "In this admirably clear and insightful work, Van der Rijt develops an original account of coercion and dignity. On the basis of his analysis of the relation between these two concepts, he also provides an intriguing new angle on the nature of republicanism. I recommend this book to anyone interested in freedom and power and their roles in normative political theory." Ian Carter - University of Pavia "In this carefully argued and original study Jan-Willem van der Rijt offers an analysis of coercion, a broadly Kantian argument that coercion is an affront to dignity, and an illuminating contrast with Philip Pettit's republicanism. A most welcome contribution." Thomas E. Hill, Jr. - University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill "Jan-Willem van der Rijt has written a well argued, original book that will prove to be extremely helpful for the philosophical inquiry of the relationship between coercion and human dignity as well as for the assessment of republicanism and its consequences." Ralf Stoecker - University of Potsdam. (shrink)

Surprise – these much-publicized rules are not the least bit reassuring to people who specialize in the study of ethics. While attention to ethics is certainly welcome, these ethical codes provide a too-easy cop-out, a way to neatly dispose of attention to nagging and pervasive problems. The typical professional code is little more than a checklist of rules that enables professionals of any stripe to give lip service to ethical behavior without engaging in continuing dialogue on ethical dilemmas. Neatly packaged (...) commandments short-circuit development of the reasoning tools to work through ethical challenges meaningfully and with long-lasting impact on the actual behavior in any field. (shrink)

In this "Dictionary," more than four hundred biographical entries encompass all the Dutch thinkers who exercised a major influence on the intellectual life of the Golden Age, as well as those who developed their ideas and beliefs through interaction with other scholars. Additional entries describe foreign philosophers who lived in the country temporarily and whose work was influenced by their stay. These include John Locke, Rene Descartes and Pierre Bayle.

The individual and society: Meerloo, J. A. M. Freedom--our mental backbone. Allport, G. Freedom. Marcuse, H. The new forms of control. Kerr, W. A. Psychology of the free competition of ideas. Eysenck, H. J. The technology of consent. Dewey, J. Toward a new individualism. Emerson, R. W. Self-reliance. Fromm, E. Freedom and democracy.--Religion and the inner man: St. Augustine. The freedom and the will. Mercier, L. J. A. Freedom of the will and psychology. Dostoyevsky, F. The grand inquisitor. Berdyaev, N. (...) Master, slave and free man. Buber, M. I and thou. Govinda, A. Time and space and the problem of free will. Prabhavananda, S. Control of the subconscious mind.--Philosophy and philosophical psychology: Bergson, H. Psychological determinism. James, W. The dilemma of determinism. Mill, J. S. The freedom of the will. Sartre, J. P. Being and doing: freedom. Wyschogrod, M. Sartre, freedom and the unconscious. May, R. Will, decision and responsibility: summary remarks. Knight, R. P. Determinism, "freedom," and psychotherapy. Royce, J. Meaning, value, and personality.--Selected bibliography (p. 393-408). (shrink)

In this paper I argue for the thesis that Stout's category of abstract particulars (what Husserl calls "moments') has played a role in the transition from Bradleian idealism to British analytic philosophy. That category plays this role as part of a new theory of wholes, parts and relations that Stout develops in opposition to Bradley. In Stout's theory abstract particulars are dependent parts of wholes. The critical remarks that G. E. Moore and Kevin Mulligan have made concerning Stout's identification of (...) abstract particulars and predicates are elaborated in this paper. Notwithstanding the fact that Stout mistakenly identifies abstract particulars with predicates, the category of abstract particulars may be of value in a theory of individuals, universals and truthmakers. (shrink)

I show how scoring rules, interpreted as measuring the inaccuracy of a set of degrees of belief, may be exploited to construct confirmation measures as used in Bayesian confirmation theory. I construct two confirmation measures from two particular standard scoring rules. One of these measures is genuinely new, the second is trivially ordinally equivalent to the difference measure. These two measures are tested against three well-known measures of confirmation in a simple but illuminating case that contains in a natural way (...) the problem of irrelevant conjunction. The genuinely new measure emerges, arguably, as the best. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the comic potential that originates in the way players of digital games take on the dual position of being at once a played self that is internal to the gameworld and a playing self that perceives this world from the outside. I first describe the comic attitude as it is defined within philosophy: as an attitude of distanced and dispassionate reflection towards an incongruity. I then show how the dual position of players during gameplay not only is (...) characterized by incongruities, such as contradictions between the apparent seriousness and the ultimate triviality of in-game actions, but also allows players to dispassionately reflect on these incongruities. I thus argue that digital gameplay entails the inherent possibility of turning players into both a comic object and a laughing subject. (shrink)

Peut-on tenter une nouvelle approche de Descartes? Penser philosophiquement la notion de creation, c'est la traduire dans le registre des quatre causes: ainsi la cause efficiente relie et separe a la fois le createur et le cree; mais Dieu est aussi cause formelle, ce qui sauve la continuite entre l'auteur et son ouvrage. Cette continuite se nomme analogie et cette analogie assure l'autonomie de la pensee finie. Ce transfert d'autorite dans la production meme, particulierement manifeste chez Descartes, permet de comprendre (...) la devolution a l'homme d'un certain pouvoir createur. L'agir humain peut etre inaugural. L'est-il en matiere de philosophie? La dette de Descartes envers la scolastique tardive semble indiquer qu'on ne pense qu'a partir de ce qu'on herite. L'ambivalence de la notion de creation ne nous permettrait-elle pas cependant de montrer que le commencement dans la pensee reste a tout moment possible? Telle pourrait etre l'explication du radicalisme cartesien. (shrink)